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Key Points
 → Unresolved sovereign debt problems 
are hurting debtor nations, their 
citizens and their creditors, and also 
can pose serious systemic threats to 
the international financial system. 
 → The existing contractual restructuring 
approach is insufficient to make 
sovereign debt sustainable. 
Although a more systematic 
legal resolution framework is 
needed, a formal multilateral 
approach, such as a treaty, is not 
currently politically viable. 
 → An informal model-law approach 
should be legally, politically and 
economically feasible. Individual 
countries could enact the proposed 
model law as their domestic law.
 → Because most sovereign debt 
contracts are governed by either 
New York or English law, it would be 
especially valuable if one or both of 
those jurisdictions enacted a proposed 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Model Law as their domestic law.
Introduction
Court decisions in the United Kingdom regarding the 
illegality of exit consents, and in the United States regarding 
pari passu clauses in Argentine sovereign debt, as well as 
debt crises in Greece, Venezuela and other countries, have 
dramatically highlighted the risks of an inadequate legal 
resolution framework for restructuring unsustainable 
sovereign debt. Unresolved sovereign debt problems are 
hurting individual debtor nations and their citizens, as well 
as their creditors. A sovereign debt default can also pose a 
serious systemic threat to the international financial system. 
The Contractual Approach  
Is Inadequate
One of the main impediments is that the existing “contractual” 
approach to sovereign debt restructuring — the use of so-
called collective action clauses (CACs) — is insufficient to 
solve the holdout problem. CACs are clauses in debt contracts 
that enable a specified supermajority, such as two-thirds 
or three-quarters, of the contracting parties to amend the 
principal amount, interest rate, maturities and other critical 
repayment terms. The holdout problem is a type of collective 
action problem in which certain creditors, such as vulture 
funds that may have bought debt in the secondary market 
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at a deep discount, hope to receive full payment by 
refusing to agree to a debt restructuring plan that 
proposes to change critical terms, even though the 
other debt holders consider the plan reasonable. 
For several reasons, CACs are insufficient to solve 
the holdout problem. Many sovereign debt contracts 
lack them, requiring unanimity to change critical 
repayment terms — and thus enabling any party to 
the contract to act as a holdout. For example, after 
years of trying to include CACs, relatively few Greek 
debt agreements actually contained such clauses and 
those that did were generally restricted to bond issues. 
Even in contracts that include CACs, the supermajority 
requirement may be so high (for example, three-
quarters) that vulture funds are able to purchase vote-
blocking positions that enable them to act as holdouts. 
Furthermore, a CAC ordinarily binds only the parties 
to the particular contract that includes it. The parties to 
any given sovereign debt contract, therefore, could act 
as holdouts in a debt restructuring plan that requires 
all of a debtor-state’s debt issues to agree to the plan. 
CACs have been a step forward in some ways, 
but they are not a substitute for pursuing a more 
systematic legal resolution framework for helping 
debtor-states to restructure unsustainable debt. In 
the past, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
unsuccessfully proposed, and the General Assembly 
of the United Nations has voted to pursue, a treaty 
or convention that would govern sovereign debt 
restructuring. The political economy of treaty making, 
however, makes that type of multilateral approach 
highly unlikely to succeed in the near future. 
Advantages of a Model-
law Approach
A model-law approach to achieving a more 
systematic legal resolution framework should be 
legally, politically and economically feasible.
As explained in the Schwarcz Article,1 a model 
law is suggested legislation for national (and 
1 An extended version of this paper contains a more detailed and 
systematic analysis: Steven L Schwarcz, “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: 
A Model-Law Approach” (2016) 6:2 J Globalization & Dev (Martin 
Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph Stiglitz, 
eds) 343 [Schwarcz Article]. It is also available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2634653.
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sometimes subnational) governments to consider 
enacting as domestic law in their jurisdictions. 
Each government enacting a model law should 
therefore take the steps necessary to make the 
law effective in its jurisdiction. To facilitate cross-
border legal comparability, each government 
enacting a model law should, ideally, enact the 
same legislative text. For that reason, model laws 
are sometimes called uniform laws. The UNCITRAL 
(United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law) Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration exemplifies a model law that has been 
uniformly enacted in an international context; the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the United 
States exemplifies a model law that has been 
uniformly enacted in a subnational context.  
The less formal process of developing and 
enacting a model law can be politically appealing. 
Indeed, adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, an 
area of law that had for many years struggled to 
realize reform, may have been successful, in part, 
due to its less formal structure as a model law. A 
model-law approach would not require general 
acceptance for its implementation. Nations and 
even subnational jurisdictions could individually 
enact a model law as their domestic law. 
This is especially significant because most sovereign 
debt contracts are governed by either New York 
or English law. One or both of those jurisdictions 
— in the case of New York law, a subnational 
jurisdiction — could enact legislation based on a 
model law. Thus, unlike the UCC, the initial goal for 
a sovereign debt restructuring model law would be 
enactment by only one or two jurisdictions. A model 
law could also be pursued in parallel as part of an 
overall strategy for developing a legal resolution 
framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
A Proposed Model Law
The Schwarcz Article proposes a Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Model Law (see the Appendix). Among 
other things, the proposed model law addresses the 
holdout problem by legally mandating supermajority 
voting that (assuming the requisite percentages 
agree) can bind dissenting classes of claims. It also 
enables a debtor-state to aggregate creditor voting 
beyond individual contracts. Aggregate voting 
is critical for at least two reasons: it can prevent 
creditors of individual sovereign debt contracts 
from acting as holdouts vis-à-vis other sovereign 
debt contracts; and it allows a debtor-state to 
designate large enough classes of claims to prevent 
vulture funds (or similar holdouts), as a practical 
matter, from purchasing enough claims to block a 
restructuring plan or otherwise control the voting. 
The proposed model law also addresses the critical 
need for a financially troubled debtor-state to obtain 
liquidity during its restructuring process. Although 
this funding has in the past often been provided by 
the IMF, the IMF may be unable, or unwilling, to 
continue providing funding in the amounts needed. 
Absent the IMF, whose loans have de facto priority, 
no one would lend new money without obtaining 
a priority repayment claim. Unless (as in the case of 
Greece) virtually all of a debtor-state’s indebtedness 
is held by a relatively small number of governmental 
organizations, it would be impractical to get the 
existing creditors to contractually subordinate 
their claims to the new money. The model law, 
however, gives such new-money lenders priority 
over existing creditors, provided existing creditors 
have notice and the opportunity to block the new 
lending if its amount is too high or its terms are 
inappropriate. (The model law does not, of course, 
prevent a debtor-state from also, or alternatively, 
obtaining such financing through a governmental 
or multi-governmental source, such as the IMF.) 
The model law contemplates a “neutral international 
organization” as the law’s supervisory authority. It 
is currently unclear what organization might qualify 
as truly neutral; existing organizations such as the 
IMF, the World Bank or a court of the debtor-state 
may be considered too political or conflicted. 
The very issue of the need for a supervisory authority 
can also raise confusion. Formal sovereign debt 
restructuring solutions, such as a treaty, are often 
conflated with the need for formal supervisory 
bodies. Under the proposed model law, however, 
the supervisory authority lacks authority to 
exercise discretion. All disputes are adjudicated 
through binding arbitration. The main role of 
the supervisory authority is administrative and 
non-discretionary: to fact-check information 
and to oversee the creditor voting process. 
The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law’s 
retroactivity might also raise a controversial legal 
issue under domestic law, and US law in particular. 
Retroactivity is essential for restructuring the 
terms of existing sovereign debt contracts. Legal 
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retroactivity is respected under international law 
so long as it is neither discriminatory nor arbitrary. 
The model law’s key operative provisions — 
supermajority aggregate voting, and the granting 
of priority to financiers of a debtor-state’s debt 
restructuring — should be neither. US constitutional 
law, however, would be relevant to interpreting 
the retroactivity of supermajority aggregate 
voting if New York State enacts the model law. 
The “Contracts Clause” in Article I, Section 10 of 
the US Constitution prohibits states (as opposed 
to the federal government) from enacting any 
legislation that impairs existing contractual 
obligations. Nonetheless, the Schwarcz Article 
concludes that New York State should be able 
to frame its enactment of the model law in such 
a way as to not violate the Contracts Clause. 
In general, a state has leeway to retroactively 
impair contracts if the impairment is reasonably 
necessary to further an important public purpose 
and also reasonable and appropriate to effectuate 
that purpose. This leeway may be even greater if 
the contractual impairment is not substantial. 
New York State, therefore, could frame its enactment 
of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law as 
an exercise of its police powers to reduce sovereign 
debt defaults that could lead to a systemic economic 
collapse, thereby protecting economic activity 
within its borders. The model law’s supermajority 
aggregate voting and granting of priority to 
financiers of a debtor-state’s debt restructuring 
are appropriately tailored to reduce that threat. 
Furthermore, any contractual impairment should 
not be “substantial”; being limited to changes 
that are voluntarily agreed to by a supermajority 
of pari passu creditors based on the debtor-
state’s deteriorating economic circumstances, 
such changes — and hence the contractual 
impairment — should reflect the economic reality 
of what those creditors expect (under those 
changed circumstances) to receive as payment. 
A final question is whether the model law would be 
economically and politically feasible. Some nations 
may be concerned, for example, that enactment of 
the model law would increase their borrowing costs 
by making creditor claims more subject to  
bail-in. Economists and other scholars have 
recently argued and provided empirical evidence 
to the contrary — that uncertainty due to the 
absence of an effective sovereign debt resolution 
framework actually increases the costs of 
borrowing. However, even if the model law 
would increase borrowing costs, that increase 
should not exceed the cost increase resulting from 
workable CACs being included in all debt contracts, 
which has been the ideal goal of the contractual 
approach to sovereign debt restructuring.  
The model law should also be politically feasible. 
As mentioned, its less formal enactment process 
can be appealing to debtor-states. The model law 
would not require general acceptance by the world’s 
nations for its implementation: only one or two 
jurisdictions (New York State and/or England) need 
enact the law for it to become widely effective. 
Furthermore, the model law could be enacted with 
total political neutrality through a “menu” option. 
Rather than enacting the model law as its default 
law governing sovereign debt restructuring, a 
jurisdiction could enact the model law but provide 
therein that sovereign debt contracts governed by 
that jurisdiction’s law would only become governed 
by the model law if the contract so specifies. 
Article 1(1)(a) of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Model Law in the Appendix provides bracketed 
alternative language to include such an option.
It is also informative to assess the model law’s 
political feasibility from the perspective of the 
politics of the IMF’s failed treaty approach. That 
approach failed for several reasons. Certain emerging 
market countries feared it would raise their cost of 
borrowing. As mentioned, however, the model law 
arguably should reduce or not affect that cost. At the 
time the IMF proposed its treaty approach, many 
believed that exchange offers could effectively amend 
the terms of sovereign debt agreements to enable 
supermajority voting. Experience, however, has long 
since undermined that belief. Some also opposed the 
IMF’s treaty approach because of suspicions about 
the IMF’s conflicting role as both treaty sponsor and 
supervisory authority thereunder. The model law, 
in contrast, is not designed by the IMF, nor is the 
IMF part of its supervisory process. Furthermore, 
as indicated, the model law limits the supervisory 
process to non-discretionary administrative 
actions. Debtor-states should therefore want — and 
creditors, other than rent-seeking holdouts, should 
want them — to enact the proposed model law. 
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Recommendations
Interested debtor-states, as well as New York State 
and England, should consider enacting the proposed 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Model Law. Even if 
that enactment doesn’t occur, however, this policy 
brief and the Schwarcz Article on which it is based 
provide a conceptual and legal analysis of how a 
model law could be structured and how a model-law 
approach could help nations to equitably restructure 
unsustainable debt burdens. To that extent, they 
should serve as incremental steps toward developing 
norms for a sovereign debt restructuring legal 
framework that goes beyond mere contracting.
Appendix 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Model Law2
Preamble
The Purpose of this Law is to provide effective 
mechanisms for restructuring unsustainable 
sovereign debt so as to reduce (a) the social 
costs of sovereign debt crises, (b) systemic risk 
to the financial system, (c) creditor uncertainty, 
and (d) the need for sovereign debt bailouts, 
which are costly and create moral hazard.
Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms
Article 1: Scope
(1)  This Law applies where, by contract or 
otherwise, (a) the law of [this jurisdiction3] 
governs [alternative: this Law is specifically 
stated to govern] the debtor-creditor 
2	 In	writing	this	model	law,	the	author	benefitted	greatly	from	discussions	
with colleagues on the International Insolvency Institute (III) Working 
Group on Sovereign Insolvencies and the CIGI ILRP Working Group on 
Cross-Border and Sovereign Insolvencies. Besides the author, the members 
of these working groups are, respectively, Donald Bernstein, Zack 
Clement, Allan Gropper, Robin Itkin, Steven T. Kargman, Kenneth N. 
Klee, Christopher Klein, Bruce Leonard, Charles W. Mooney, Christoph 
Paulus and Ignacio Tirado; and Mona Davies, Oonagh Fitzgerald, Mark 
Jewett, Bruce Leonard, John Murray, Catherine Walsh and Miranda Xafa.
3 This would refer to a jurisdiction enacting this model law, for example, 
New York, England, a nation, etc. Articles 3(3) and 12 further expand 
this	law’s	application.
relationship between a State and its 
creditors and (b) the application of this Law 
is invoked in accordance with Chapter II.
(2)  [This provision is optional] Where this Law 
applies, it shall operate retroactively 
and, without limiting the foregoing, shall 
override any contractual provisions that are 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 2: Use of Terms
For purposes of this Law:
(1) “creditor” means a person or entity 
that has a claim against a State;
(2) “claim” means a payment claim against 
a State for monies borrowed or for the 
State’s guarantee of, or other contingent 
obligation on, monies borrowed; and the 
term “monies borrowed” shall include the 
following, whether or not it represents the 
borrowing of money per se: monies owing 
under bonds, debentures, notes, or similar 
instruments; monies owing for the deferred 
purchase price of property or services, other 
than trade accounts payable arising in the 
ordinary course of business; monies owing on 
capitalized lease obligations; monies owing 
on or with respect to letters of credit, bankers’ 
acceptances, or other extensions of credit; and 
monies owing on money-market instruments 
or instruments used to finance trade;
(3) “Plan” means a debt restructuring 
plan contemplated by Chapter III;
(4) “State” means a sovereign nation;
(5) “Supervisory Authority” means [name of 
neutral international organization].
Chapter	II:	Invoking	the	Law’s	Application
Article 3: Petition for Relief, and Recognition
(1) A State may invoke application of this 
Law by filing a voluntary petition for 
relief with the Supervisory Authority. 
(2) Such petition shall certify that the State 
(a) seeks relief under this Law, and has not 
previously sought relief under this Law (or 
under any other law that is substantially 
in the form of this Law) during the past 
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[ten] years, (b) needs relief under this Law 
to restructure claims that, absent such 
relief, would constitute unsustainable 
debt of the State, (c) agrees to restructure 
those claims in accordance with this Law, 
(d) agrees to all other terms, conditions, 
and provisions of this Law, and (e) has 
duly enacted any national law needed to 
effectuate these agreements. If requested by 
the Supervisory Authority, such petition shall 
also attach documents and legal opinions 
evidencing compliance with clause (e).
(3) Immediately after such a petition for relief has 
been filed, and so long as such filing has not 
been dismissed by the Supervisory Authority 
[or this jurisdiction] for lack of good faith, 
the terms, conditions, and provisions of this 
Law shall (a) apply to the debtor-creditor 
relationship between the State and its creditors 
to the extent such relationship is governed by 
the law of [this jurisdiction]; (b) apply to the 
debtor-creditor relationship between the State 
and its creditors to the extent such relationship 
is governed by the law of another jurisdiction 
that has enacted law substantially in the form 
of this Law; and (c) be recognized in, and 
by, all other jurisdictions that have enacted 
law substantially in the form of this Law.
Article 4: Notification of Creditors
(1)  Within 30 days after filing its petition 
for relief, the State shall notify all of 
its known creditors of its intention to 
negotiate a Plan under this Law. 
(2)  The Supervisory Authority shall prepare 
and maintain a current list of creditors of 
the State and verify claims for purposes 
of supervising voting under this Law.
Chapter III: Voting on a Debt  
Restructuring Plan
Article 5: Submission of Plan
(1)   The State may submit a Plan to its 
creditors at any time, and may submit 
alternative Plans from time to time.
(2)   No other person or entity may submit a Plan.
Article 6: Contents of Plan
A Plan shall
(1)   designate classes of claims in 
accordance with Article 7(3);
(2)   specify the proposed treatment 
of each class of claims; 
(3)   provide the same treatment for each claim 
of a particular class, unless the holder of a 
claim agrees to a less favorable treatment;
(4)   disclose any claims not included 
in the Plan’s classes of claims; 
(5)   provide adequate means for the Plan’s 
implementation including, with respect to 
any claims, curing or waiving any defaults or 
changing the maturity dates, principal amount, 
interest rate, or other terms or cancelling or 
modifying any liens or encumbrances; and
(6)   certify that, if the Plan becomes effective 
and binding on the State and its 
creditors under Article 7(1), the State’s 
debt will become sustainable. 
Article 7: Voting on the Plan
(1)   A Plan shall become effective and binding 
on the State and its creditors when it has 
been submitted by the State and agreed 
to by each class of such creditors’ claims 
designated in the Plan under Article 6(1). 
Thereupon, the State shall be discharged 
from all claims included in those classes of 
claims, except as provided in the Plan.
(2)   A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if 
creditors holding at least [two-thirds] 
in amount and more than [one-half] 
in number of the claims of such class 
[voting on such Plan4] [entitled to vote 
on such Plan] agree to the Plan.
(3)   Each class of claims shall consist of claims 
against the State that are pari passu in priority, 
provided that (a) pari passu claims need not 
all be included in the same class, (b) claims 
of governmental or multi-governmental 
entities each shall be classed separately, 
4 The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but 
reliable notice to creditors then becomes more important.
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and (c) claims that are governed by this 
Law or the law of another jurisdiction that 
is substantially in the form of this Law 
shall not be classed with other claims. 
Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring
Article 8: Terms of Lending
(1)   Subject to Article 8(3), the State shall have 
the right to borrow money on such terms 
and conditions as it deems appropriate.
(2)   The State shall notify all of its known 
creditors of its intention to borrow under 
Article 8(1), the terms and conditions of the 
borrowing, and the proposed use of the loan 
proceeds. Such notice shall also direct those 
creditors to respond to the Supervisory 
Authority within 30 days as to whether 
they approve or disapprove of such loan. 
(3)   Any such loan must be approved by 
creditors holding at least two-thirds 
in amount of the claims of creditors 
responding to the Supervisory Authority 
within that 30-day period. 
(4)  In order for the priority of repayment 
(and corresponding subordination) under 
Article 9 to be effective, any such loan must 
additionally be approved by creditors holding 
at least two-thirds in principal amount of the 
“covered” claims of creditors responding to 
the Supervisory Authority within that 30-
day period. Claims shall be deemed to be 
“covered” if they are governed by this Law 
or by the law of another jurisdiction that 
is substantially in the form of this Law. 
Article 9: Priority of Repayment
(1)   The State shall repay loans approved under 
Article 8 prior to paying any other claims. 
(2)   The claims of creditors of the State are 
subordinated to the extent needed to 
effectuate the priority payment under 
this Article 9. Such claims are not 
subordinated for any other purpose.
(3)  The priority of repayment (and 
corresponding subordination) under 
this Article 9 is expressly subject to the 
approval by creditors under Article 8(4). 
Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes
Article 10: Arbitration
(1)   All disputes arising under this Law 
shall be resolved by binding arbitration 
before a panel of three arbitrators. 
(2)   The arbitration shall be governed by [generally 
accepted international arbitration rules of 
(name of neutral international arbitration 
body)] [the rules of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes/ 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution/ 
International Chamber of Commerce 
International Court of Arbitration/ specify 
other international arbitration organization].
(3) Notwithstanding Article 10(2), if all the parties 
to an arbitration contractually agree that such 
arbitration shall be governed by other rules, 
it shall be so governed. Such agreement may 
be made before or after the dispute arises.
(4) The State shall pay all costs, fees, and 
expenses of the arbitrations.
Chapter VI: Opt In
Article 11: Opting in to this Law
(1) Any creditors of the State whose claims 
are not otherwise governed by this Law 
may contractually opt in to this Law’s 
terms, conditions, and provisions.  
(2) The terms, conditions, and provisions of 
this Law shall apply to the debtor-creditor 
relationship between the State and creditors 
opting in under Article 11(1) as if such 
relationship were governed by the law of 
[this jurisdiction] under Article 3(3).
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